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Abstract 
 With the recent tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, CT, the public and the 
government are looking for solutions to school violence. The National Rifle Association (NRA), 
a second amendment, pro-gun advocacy group, has proposed an "education and training 
emergency response program" called The National School Shield, which advocates the 
placement of armed security in schools. Although the program sounds provocative, serious 
questions complicate its plausibility, necessity, motive, and effectiveness. Furthermore, the 
potential policy and practical ramifications of encouraging armed security forces in U.S. schools 
are complex. The authors examined the proposal's key elements from a public policy perspective 
and determined that the NRA program would be expensive in terms of both implementation and 
civil and/or criminal liability, would increase juvenile contact with the criminal justice system, 
would increase the potential for injuries and deaths from firearms, and would potentially only 
serve to increase profits for those invested in security industries. More potentially effective and 
safe policy alternatives are offered. 
  
Introduction 
 The NRA wants the public to believe that schools are not safe places to send children 
(Hutchinson, December 23, 2012). This is currently becoming a widespread belief due, in part, to 
speakers like Lt. Col. (ret.) Dave Grossman, developer of "killology," who proclaimed in a recent 
address to the West Virginia Safe Schools Summit that school violence is the "leading cause of 
death" of children (Grossman, 2013).  
 Both claims are flat-out untrue.  To refute Grossman's claim, unintentional injury is the 
leading cause of death among ages 5-24, although homicide is the second leading cause of death 
among ages 15-24.  While homicide by firearms is the leading cause of violence-related injury 
death among ages 5-9 and 15-24, nearly all of these deaths occurred away from schools (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010).   
 Contrary to the NRAs claim, school violence is decreasing (Robers, Zhang, Truman & 
Snyder, 2012) and "schools are the safest place for a student to be" (Brock, as cited in Neuman, 
2012).  From 2009 to 2010, 33 violent deaths of students, staff, and non-students occurred at 
schools. Of these, 17 school age youth (ages 5-18) were victims of homicide and 1 was a victim 
of suicide. These figures represent the lowest number of total violent deaths since 1992 (when 
this started being measured), the lowest number of student deaths since 2001-02, and the lowest 
number of suicides since 1996-97. In fact, during the 2009-10 school year, there was only about 
1 homicide or suicide of a school age youth at school for every 2.7 million students enrolled 
(Robers et al., 2012). 
 School-age youth are much more at risk of violent death away from school.  The most 
recent available data indicate that, since 1992, less than 2% of youth violent deaths have 
occurred at school (National Center for Injury Prevention & Control, 2012), which means that 
more than 98% occurred elsewhere.  When rape, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault 
are considered, rates at school in 2009-10 (4 per 1,000) did not statistically differ from those 
occurring away from school (5 per 1,000). 
 Tragic incidents of school violence like the one at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 
Newtown, CT on December 14, 2012, however, add fuel to the fire regarding school violence.  
Naturally, a shooting that claims the lives of 20 children and 8 adults (including Adam and 
Nancy Lanza) at a place where millions of people send their children every day results in 
numerous calls for action. The majority of those calls revolve around two major areas- gun 
control, and additional security measures for schools, including the use of armed security 
personnel.   
 Those who advocate gun control measures focus primarily on the background check 
process and loopholes in background checks related to the purchase of weapons from places 
other than authorized dealers (e.g., gun shows), and on the availability of assault weapons and 
high capacity magazines.  Although school security includes several types of procedural tactics, 
such as controlling access to school grounds and/or school buildings, metal detectors, requiring 
visitors to sign-in, telephones in the classrooms, and security cameras to monitor the school, 
those who advocate additional security measures as a solution focus on the placement of trained, 
armed personnel in every school.  This is the primary feature of The National School Shield 
program proposed by the NRA.     
Policy Implications and Practical Ramifications of The National School Shield Proposal  
 At a December 21, 2012 news conference, Wayne LaPierre, CEO and Executive Vice 
President of the NRA, introduced former Congressman and former Director of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Asa Hutchinson, to give a brief overview of the program 
(LaPierre, 2012).  This overview mentioned “two key elements” which would be guided by his 
“team of experts.”  Those two key elements are the development of a model security plan, and 
the use of community volunteers as armed security.  
Team of Experts & Model Security Plans 
Given the scope and potential impact of the NRA proposal, and the fact that it involves 
children on a national level, it is essential to carefully examine its components.  First, Hutchinson 
discusses a "team of experts," but does not describe who would comprise this team, how they 
would be selected, or who would evaluate their level of expertise.  This team is supposed to take 
the lead in fleshing out, developing, and implementing a proposal to address a complex, multi-
faceted issue involving the lives of millions of children and adults 
Apparently, these individuals will be developing “model security plans” for schools to 
follow, and consulting with school officials, law enforcement officials, and parents all across the 
United States, although it is unclear who will pay these experts for their services and how much 
it will cost.  One major concern is the real probability that these experts may have conflicts of 
interest because they could benefit financially and politically if schools adopt their programs and 
purchase equipment and manpower required for program implementation. These potential 
conflicts of interest are discussed below.                
Use of Trained, Armed Security Personnel & Community Volunteers 
 The model security plan consists of a "comprehensive strategy for school security based 
on the latest, most up-to-date technical information from the foremost experts in their fields” 
(Hutchinson, 2012).  Part of this plan is the use of “armed, trained, qualified school security 
personnel," but Hutchinson notes that this would be “a decision to be made by parents at the 
local level” (2012).   
 Hutchinson has publicly advocated the idea of placing trained guards to staff the proposal 
and emphasized that untrained guards should not be placed in schools.  Supporting Hutchinson's 
position, a recent Gallup poll indicated that the majority of Americans surveyed, regardless of 
political affiliation, believe that placing armed officers at schools is the answer to school 
shooting tragedies (O’Brien, 2012).   
Insert Table 1 About Here 
 Hutchinson is not the first to suggest armed guards in schools.  It became a popular idea 
after the Columbine shooting in 1999, and currently, approximately 27% of schools in the U.S. 
have some sort of daily police or security presence (Snyder & Dillow, 2012).  Richland County, 
South Carolina, for example, has armed "Resource Officers" at all its middle and high schools, 
while elementary schools have one officer for every two schools.  Officer salaries are shared by 
the school district and Richland County Sheriff’s Department (Rich, 2012). 
 However, concerns similar to those over the selection of the "team of experts" also 
surface with respect to the selection of the “armed, trained, qualified school security personnel.”  
Hutchinson has offered no elaboration on whether these personnel will be certified bonded police 
officers who will assume these tasks as part of their official details, "moonlighting" police 
officers who will work at schools "off-duty," retired police officers or military, private security 
officers, existing school personnel (i.e., armed staff, teachers and/or administrators), or parents or 
other community volunteers.   
 The selection, verification of qualifications (e.g., background checks; proficiency with 
firearms), training, and certification of these individuals is critical, yet Hutchinson has offered no 
insight into these processes or who will do them.  It also is unknown what weapons these 
personnel will use or have access to, or where and how those weapons will be stored and 
maintained.  Each of these concerns involves myriad liability issues which are addressed below.  
Although Hutchinson emphasized that having armed security personnel is not the only 
element of the plan, he did not elaborate on any other component.  LaPierre, in his introductory 
remarks, described a "multi-faceted program . . .developed by the very best experts in their 
fields" consisting of everything from "building design and access control to information 
technology to student and teacher training" (LaPierre, 2012).  These hints of additional 
programmatic aspects raise more questions about responsibility.  It is an expensive endeavor to 
design, modify, or construct a building.  It also is expensive to update, install, or augment 
information systems, or to modify, install, supplement, or change security systems.  In 2006, 
Education Department analysts in Connecticut estimated that a multiple camera security system 
with a "buzzer" entry, scan cards, a "duress" alarm system with panic buttons, and a portal metal 
detector with two trained security personnel for a large high school could cost up to $480,000 
(Lohman & Shepard, 2006).  This would be much higher in 2013 dollars.   
Someone will be hired to do build or modify buildings, to install or update security 
systems, and to provide metal detectors.  Someone will be selected to provide (i.e., sell) 
equipment, supplies, hardware, and software.  Someone will be hired to monitor and maintain all 
of the equipments, systems, hardware, and software.  Someone will be hired to train and equip 
personnel.  Conveniently, “the National Rifle Association is the natural, obvious choice to 
sponsor" the program (Hutchinson, 2012).  Of concern, however, is such a seemingly ready-
made provider of all things necessary for the level of school security required for the safety of 
children.  Clearly, conflicts of interest abound.     
 The second key element is the use of community volunteers to avoid "massive funding 
from local authorities or the federal government" (Hutchinson, 2012).  Setting aside the issue of 
funding for the moment because LaPierre (2012) declared in his introduction that Hutchinson 
would have a "budget provided by the NRA of whatever scope" required, allowing armed 
community volunteers to have such intimate access to children and school personnel would seem 
to increase the risk of harm.   
 Requirements for background checks of those involved with public schools vary widely 
from state to state.  While 25 states and the District of Columbia require criminal history checks 
for all public school employees, only 5 require such checks of all contractors, and only 8 require 
checks of individuals that volunteer (Government Accountability Office, 2010).  When checks 
are required, "they may not be adequate because they are not national, fingerprint-based, or 
recurring" (GAO, 2010, p. 6).  Moreover, many states have no restrictions on employing former 
sex offenders.   
 Even when background checks are conducted, people with bad intentions can sometimes 
make their way to positions of power and authority.  For example, in 2010, the owner of a 
security company and chief of security for a public school district in Wyoming, Michigan, was 
charged with 2 counts of criminal sexual conduct after using his position to have sex with a then-
14 year old girl on at least 2 occasions (McCann, 2010). During the first 44 days of 2013, the 
following 22 criminal incidents involving security guards or officers have been reported on 
Private Officer News Network (privateofficernews.wordpress.com):  
 security guard in Newport News, VA arrested for home burglary 
 security guard in St. Augustine, FL arrested for burglary, theft, exploitation of the elderly 
 security guard in New Orleans, LA arrested for illegal use of a weapon 
 security guard on probation in Redding, CA arrested for meth possession, possession of 
an unlawful weapon, possession of ammunition by a felon, and felony probation violation 
 security guard in Jackson, TN arrested for felony vandalism after destroying Jewish 
artifacts 
 security officer in Murrells Inlet, SC arrested for shoplifting 
 school security guard in Homestead, FL is under investigation for sexual assault 
 school district Security Supervisor and former police sergeant in Wichita, KS arrested for 
indecent liberties with a child and criminal sodomy  
 security guard in Orange County, FL arrested for shining a laser at a sheriff's helicopter 
 armored car driver in Bryan, TX arrested for armed robbery 
 security guard in Memphis, TN arrested for attempted murder 
 campus security guard in Middletown, CT arrested for a string of felony thefts 
 Walt Disney World security guard in Davenport, FL arrested for 8 counts of possession 
of child pornography 
 security guard in Spring Hill, FL arrested for credit card fraud 
 middle school security guard in Little Rock, AR arrested for 2 counts of second degree 
sexual assault 
 2 TSA officers in Atlanta, GA arrested for conspiring to smuggle drugs 
 a security guard in Atlanta, GA, with a history of mental illness, convicted of murder 
 a State Department security officer in Alexandria, VA convicted of accepting bribes 
 a school security guard in Tacoma, WA arrested for 3 counts of first degree sexual 
misconduct with a minor 
 2 security guards in Memphis, TN arrested for aggravated assault 
 an unarmed school security guard in Garfield, NJ arrested for impersonating an officer, 
possession of a weapon without a permit and possession of a weapon on school property  
 security guard at a middle school in Little Rock, AR arrested for second degree sexual 
assault involving a minor 
 If security guards are placed in every school in the United States, it is frightening to think 
how this problem would be exponentially magnified.  Using local volunteers would seem to 
exacerbate the potential for unqualified, criminal, and/or ill-intentioned individuals to take 
advantage of such unique, and potentially unsupervised, access to children.  Allowing more 
people into schools will give more people access to the children.  If a child is harmed by an 
overly zealous armed security member or sexually assaulted by a pedophile that has slipped 
through the system, someone would have to be held liable. This very real potential is not worth 
the risk of hiring community volunteers who may not be subjected to thorough national-level, 
fingerprint-based background checks that are repeated on a regular basis, especially when 
officers who have been through such checks commit crimes such as the ones listed above.    
 Hutchinson described a program at his son's school in his home state of Arkansas, where 
2 of the 22 criminal incidents above occurred at middle schools, called “Watchdog Dads.”  In 
this program, fathers of school children “volunteer their time at schools to patrol playgrounds 
and provide a measure of added security” (Hutchinson, 2012).  Although Arkansas is one of the 
few states that does require national, fingerprint-based background checks on all teachers and on 
all non-licensed personnel (GAO, 2010), this is a rarity, and apparently people with ill intent still 
slip through. Hutchinson implies the NRA program would function similar to this program 
except that the dads would be armed. However, simply being a parent of a child confers neither 
the right, nor the ability, nor the responsibility to oversee others’ children. 
Hutchinson concluded his second key element by offering the assurance that “whether 
they're retired police, retired military or rescue personnel, I think there are people in every 
community in this country, who would be happy to serve, if only someone asked them and gave 
them the training and certification to do so” (Hutchinson, 2012).  In difficult economic times and 
increased public fear, people often will turn to anyone or anything for help.  When available 
options seem to be essentially “free” in the reality of dwindling school budgets, they are very 
attractive.  Moreover, when those options seem to alleviate external pressures, such as parental 
fear, they become almost impossible to turn down.  Will, and more importantly, can schools, in 
their desperation to protect children and alleviate parental and public fear, be vigilant enough to 
know who they are trusting with access to their children? 
Hutchinson asserts that the NRA's “gun safety, marksmanship and hunter education 
programs have set the standard for well over a century," and that "over the past 25 years, their 
Eddie Eagle Gunsafe Program has taught over 26 million kids that real guns aren't toys and 
today, child gun accidents are at the lowest levels ever recorded” (Hutchinson, 2012).  However, 
this assurance does not negate the potential issues that would arise if the NRA does become 
responsible for the training of most, if not all, of the armed security officers under this plan.  The 
NRA is still a private organization with very little, if any, governmental control or oversight.  
Currently, those who participate in their training programs do so willingly and accept any 
liability or injury that may occur to themselves or others they encounter.  If their training 
becomes mandated to some, they must accept the inherent liability which comes with training for 
those who will serve the public in such a crucial and dangerous role.  The potential for that 
liability looms large for anyone who “certifies” that another person knows how, and more 
importantly, when to fire a weapon.  The school environment simply exacerbates this potential 
problem.                          
Responsibility and Liability Issues 
The success of the NRA proposal rests on the assumption that putting more guns in 
schools will keep guns out of schools.  LaPierre argues that Gun-Free Zones are an “invitation to 
mayhem,” to those wishing to harm children (Sullivan, 2012).  These zones are well-advertised 
to inform everyone coming onto school property that all firearms, except those carried by 
security personnel, are banned on school property, and that anyone violating that policy can be 
arrested.  LaPierre believes that these zones are places where potential perpetrators are 
guaranteed access to large numbers of children with little or no chance of being confronted by 
anyone with a weapon and he uses this as a foundation for the recommendation that all schools 
have armed security.  In essence, LaPierre recommends that problems stemming from weapons 
can be solved by weapons (LaPierre, 2012). 
This concept has a serious potential flaw. The presence of armed security means the 
presence of weapons.  Law enforcement officers are taught to remember that even if they 
encounter someone without a weapon, a weapon is still present, theirs.  Even schools that are 
truly successful in preventing students from bringing weapons onto school grounds will still have 
weapons if armed security is present.  Students may have their cars searched in the school 
parking lot, have their persons searched at the school entrance, and have their lockers randomly 
searched to prevent them from carrying a weapon on school property. However, those same 
students will know that they do not need to bring weapons to school, weapons will be there.  The 
only remaining question at that point is how to obtain one of those weapons.  It is easy to 
imagine that the more desire a student has to obtain a weapon, the more violence that student will 
generate to obtain it. 
Another concern is the potential liability that is involved with increasing the risk to 
children, to staff, and to the security officers themselves.  If sworn police officers provide this 
security as part of their duty assignment, then the liability is assumed by that police jurisdiction.  
"Moonlighting" officers, who would be providing security "off-duty," outside of their normal job 
requirements, would likely not be covered and either the school district or the officer would have 
to purchase supplemental liability insurance.  Luckily, retired police officers can purchase up to 
$250,000 of "retired law enforcement officer self-defense coverage," provided by the "NRA 
Endorsed Property & Casualty Insurance Program" and administered by Lockton Affinity, LLC 
(http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/retiredofficer.htm), but it is not clear whether this insurance 
would cover the retired police officer who chose to take a position providing security for a 
school.  Individuals who are hired and trained by private security providers would be insured 
against liability by the agency.  It is unclear whether any liability insurance would cover trained, 
armed community volunteers, but if it would, the cost of that insurance would most likely be 
borne by the individual or by the school district and this cost could quickly become prohibitive.  
 Numerous scenarios become evident when thinking about the potential liability of those 
placed in school security positions.  Even firing on a would-be school shooter trying to enter a 
school would likely bring civil suits from that person's family.  In addition, if a shooter happened 
to make it past security, even more significant liability issues arise.  If an innocent bystander is 
injured or killed by that security person or if the security person does not act quickly enough and 
the shooter injures or kills students or staff, that officer can potentially be held liable.  These are 
all scenarios that any school district hiring security staff must consider.    
In addition to liability related to those the security is intended to protect, the security 
personnel are at risk of injury or death.  In 2012, 112 private security officers died or were killed 
on-duty; 58% of the officers died from shootings, 13% from trauma, 8% from stabbings, and the 
remainder from medical issues, industrial or car accidents, and drowning.  Overall, more than 
70,000 incidents were reported involving private security officers as the targets of violence 
(verbal and physical assault) (Private Officer International, 2013).  Between January 1 and 
February 11, 2013, 14 deaths of private security officers were reported (Private Officer 
International, 2013), but it is not clear how many of these officers were armed.  
As more schools add more armed security, and as schools establish armories full of high 
powered weapons which are to be immediately available in emergencies, the potential risk and 
liability exponentially increases.  Individuals who carry these weapons must know how to use 
them, when to use them, and how to maintain control of them.  More weapons in schools, no 
matter who has them, the more chances for them to fall into the wrong hands and be used 
unsafely and/or unlawfully.  There is always inherent liability and danger for those who carry 
guns as well as those who allow them to be carried. 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Impact on Individual Freedoms and Choice of Employers and Employees 
Another area of potential conflict is the freedom of choice of those involved either 
directly by being required to carry a weapon or peripherally by having to conduct daily business 
with colleagues who are armed.  This is evidenced in many jurisdictions who are already 
implementing programs similar to the one proposed by the NRA.  While the NRA proposal does 
not recommend that school administrators, teachers, and staff be armed, many schools are 
allowing their teachers, principals, and/or custodial and maintenance staff to bring concealed 
weapons to their campuses (McKinley, 2008), and several states are currently considering 
legislation that would allow this (e.g., Colorado, Michigan).  As of January 15, 2013, 18 states 
allow adults to carry firearms on school grounds with written permission from a principal or 
school board (Huffington Post, 2013).    
Numerous recent surveys of educators in K-12 schools have offered a glimpse into what 
American teachers may be thinking with respect to the issue of more guns in their schools.  
Teachers in Connecticut, for example, "overwhelmingly oppose having its workforce carry guns 
on campus" (Thomas, 2013), and 67% of teachers in California believe hiring a counselor would 
be more effective at preventing school violence than hiring a police officer (McGreevy, 2013).  
Various teachers unions, such as the one in Fairfax County, Virginia, voice similar concerns, 
with more than 60% of the union members in that county saying they did not want guns in 
schools (Hendry, 2013).  The majority of surveys and polls indicate that most teachers do not 
want teachers, staff, or administrators carrying guns, and especially do not want to carry one.  
School boards, however, may have different perceptions which could lead to tension between 
teachers and district administrators.   
Kenneth S. Trump, President of National School Safety and Security Services, "advises 
against arming teachers and school staff" and outlines at least 9 considerations, many related to 
civil liability, for schools considering arming teachers or other staff (National School Safety and 
Security Services, 2013).  Civil suits, and possibly charges of criminal negligence against school 
districts are likely when those districts assume responsibility for the actions of teachers who are 
required to carry weapons or who are forced to interact closely with others who carry weapons.  
This would not be an inexpensive undertaking.   
Parents and other community members also have a say and the NRA proposal is getting 
mixed reviews (Zagorski, 2012).  LaPierre and Hutchinson both stated that the choice of whether 
a local school will have armed security (whatever that may mean) is a choice to be made by local 
parents.  Theoretically, this is plausible, but practically, it could be a logistical nightmare.  Given 
the amount of national debate generated immediately following any shooting at an American 
school, it is safe to assume that those debates at the local levels could become heated.  
 Obviously, these decisions will reflect popular opinion at the local levels, but that might 
not be smart policy.  With this type of potentially litigious decision, it is probably not advisable 
to let majority rule on a decision that will impact the lives of everyone from the students to the 
teaching faculty to the staff to the parents.  If the parents decide to allow armed faculty, the 
school district will ultimately be responsible for suits and criminal charges arising from bad 
choices or accidents that injure or kill someone.     
 
 
The Profit Motive 
Some estimate that funding the NRA proposal will cost $4 to $6 billion, while 
Hutchinson puts forth a more conservative estimate of $2 to $3 billion. Either estimate means 
huge potential profits for private security companies (Murphy, 2012; O’Brien, 2012).  Although 
LaPierre (2012) declared in his introduction that Hutchinson would have a "budget provided by 
the NRA of whatever scope" required, this budget most assuredly only refers to plan 
development and not implementation.  Implementing the plan would certainly fall to school 
districts requiring them to use local and/or state tax dollars to recruit trained, armed volunteers, 
to recruit volunteers that they must train and arm, to hire trained, armed private security, or to 
divert public law enforcement services.  Except for using public law enforcement, each of the 
above options would require training and/or personnel, which would necessitate the involvement 
of entities that provide security training and/or personnel.   
 If school districts contract with existing private security agencies, which is one of the 
least costly options, the quality of protection may be at stake.  Although private security 
contractors have widely been used in many government sponsored initiatives, such as the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, more experienced contractors have complained that the pool of security 
officers has been diluted by lowered qualifications, which has led to decreased salaries and 
benefits (Kelly, 2011).  In any private endeavor, profit is an inherent factor.  Profit may or may 
not be achieved at the sacrifice of quality, but there is less regulation and recourse in the private 
security industry than in government agencies. 
 In addition to the potential financial boon for the security industry, other industries stand 
to profit handsomely.  With the movie theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado, and the school 
shooting in Newtown, we see various products making their way to the marketplace promising 
parents that their children will be safer.  For example, a company is offering bullet-proof 
backpacks (Dewey, 2012). Sales of the backpacks soared to such a level after the Newtown 
shootings that their website crashed at least once (CBSLA.com, 2012). The effectiveness of such 
products seems to be lost in the fear many have after such tragic incidents.  Students often are 
prohibited by school policy from wearing their backpacks during the day, so the actual practical 
protection is little and the backpacks can only stop the types of ammunition used in some of the 
shootings.  Furthermore, statistics indicate that schools are very safe and that the psychological 
presence of armed guards and these kinds of products being offered via the security industry can 
have damaging psychological effects (Dewey, 2012; Jennings, Khey, Maskaly, and Donner, 
2011).  
The Line Between Public and Private Becomes a Slippery Slope 
It has been 12 years since the Columbine school shooting tragedy and the United States is 
no closer to an effective solution for school violence.  Columbine spurred the nation to 
implement zero tolerance policies, video surveillance, and armed guards or police officers in 
schools.  The research to date is sparse, but some of the studies indicate that the efforts have been 
counterproductive in that they have yielded decreased attendance as well as an increase in arrest 
for minor offenses (Skiba, 2012; Jennings, Khey, Maskalay, and Donner, 2011).   
If the U.S. follows the NRA proposal and insists that every public school have an armed 
officer, it is hard to know where the line will be drawn if it is followed to its logical conclusion. 
School bus violence, for example, has increased in recent years (Lang, 2005).  Perhaps buses that 
provide transportation also will be required to have surveillance systems and armed drivers or 
guards.  Additionally, school yards and playgrounds, where violence has been known to take 
place, are open territories with little protection or surveillance. Prohibiting outdoor activities or 
providing guards in watchtowers would turn schools into prison-like environments instead of 
environments conducive to learning. 
Implementing security ideas from fields that have an impact on school safety is possible. 
Architecture, for example, has long been contributing to school security in terms of designing 
and building educational structures that are both aesthetically pleasing and safe (Halbig, 2008).  
Security measures have been incorporated into school design since Columbine, but many 
currently are calling for an examination of how additional security measure can be incorporated 
into education venues.   
Again, balance may be the key.  Numerous architectural features may assist in school 
safety without turning schools into prison-like fortresses.  Some examples are single school 
entrances, automatically locking doors, reduced landscaping, relocating restrooms away from the 
entrance, creating a separate entrance for employees, and designating lanes in front of school 
entrances to only be accessible by buses (Crow, 2000; Gubrecht, 2012). 
It is not possible to prevent all school shootings, even with additional security measures. 
An examination of the security policy at Sandy Hook Elementary would probably reveal that 
school officials responded appropriately and could not have prevented the shooting, regardless of 
police presence or additional architectural security measures.  The U.S. secures airports and 
courthouses as government-run public spaces, but a worrisome question about the potential 
extent of these security precautions is whether these measures eventually will be forced upon 
privately owned public spaces.  Some shopping malls, for example, often provide small private 
security forces, but if the NRA policy is implemented in schools, other public places may be 
pressured to follow suit.   
Many advocates of the NRA policy point to Israel as an example of a country that places 
armed guards in all schools. Israel also places armed guards at restaurants, malls, parking lots, 
and many other public spaces (Associated Press, 2012).  If Israel is the role model for successful 
school security policy, other areas may follow.  The U.S. and Israel, however, differ in two 
fundamental ways regarding gun control.  First, Israel has strict gun laws and does not guarantee 
the right to bear arms under its constitution.  A gun license in Israel requires several layers of 
screening and renewal every three years, which is not automatic. Second, Israel requires every 
able citizen to serve a term in the military, which teaches the proper use of firearms.  Even Israeli 
military personnel who use guns while serving still have to apply for licenses to keep guns as 
private citizens and are subject to the same renewal policy as any other citizen (Associated Press, 
2012).  Israeli officials have said that the actions proposed by the NRA are not comparable to 
Israel's. In fact, Israeli officials contend that they have armed guards at schools as part of their 
comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism and do not recommend the NRA policy given that 
school shootings are not linked to national security in the U.S. (Associated Press, 2012). 
Conclusion 
 The resolution to school violence, especially mass shootings like the ones at Columbine 
and Newtown, is not simple.  The NRA, however, proposes a superficially simple solution in its 
National School Shield program with armed security personnel comprised of community 
volunteers with implementation funded primarily by local dollars.  Preventing school violence by 
focusing on the symptom of the problem is not the answer.  As many emphasized after 
Newtown, the problem is troubled students, many who have suffered from significant mental 
health issues, behavioral disorders, and the systemic neglect of parents and teachers (Newman, 
2004).  The availability of weapons, especially assault-type weapons compounds the issue 
(Crews & Crews, 2013).   
 To prevent school violence, society must first address troubled youth who have easy 
access to weapons.  Although scholars have been reluctant to develop any "profile" of school 
shooters, case studies have found that many had known or suspected mental health issues, family 
dysfunction, school problems, and social isolation, not necessarily as “loners,” but perhaps in 
small, close-knit groups of “outsider” youth (Crews & Crews, 2013; Newman, 2004).  In many 
cases, but not all, the shooter had been bullied.  Many had problems with just one or two students 
and several shooters recently had experienced the end of a close relationship.  Depression and 
planned or completed suicide was common.  Several living school shooters had initially planned 
only to kill themselves at school, but ended up feeling cornered and that they had nothing to lose 
by taking others with them (Crews & Crews, 2013).  More shooters have killed themselves 
(suicide or “suicide by cop” during or immediately after the incident, or suicide while 
incarcerated) than currently are alive (Crews & Crews, 2013).  Finally, nearly all shooters had 
told one or more peers or adults about their plans (Crews & Crews, 2013; Newman, 2004).  
When concerned friends did report to an adult, they were not taken seriously or the reports were 
made too late.  
 It is unclear whether armed guards prevent school violence.  In fact, a recent study found 
the presence of armed guards in New Orleans schools to be correlated with higher rates of school 
violence (Jennings, Khey, Maskaly & Donner, 2011).  It is even less clear whether an armed 
security force comprised of community volunteers would prevent school violence.   
 According to the most recent data (2007-2008), 27% of elementary and secondary 
schools in the United States have daily police or security presence (Snyder & Dillow, 2012), 
although it is not readily ascertainable what percentage are armed.  In fact, armed guards were 
employed both by Columbine High School and Virginia Tech, where two of the most deadly 
school shootings have occurred.  Security involved in one recent incident claims that a shooting 
was interrupted by an armed officer before it resulted in serious injuries or deaths.  At least 5 
people, however, were shot or injured by flying glass at Granite Hills High School near San 
Diego when an El Cajon police officer shot and immobilized the student, 17 year old Jason 
Hoffman, before he could enter the building (Moore, 2012). Hoffman succeeded, after two failed 
attempts, in hanging himself in jail while he awaited sentencing (Perry, 2001).    
 On the other hand, it is clear that schools with armed security have their students arrested 
or detained at nearly five times the rate of schools without armed guards (Shen, 2013).  Students, 
who would be made to serve detention or suspended for a few days in schools without armed 
security, are going to juvenile detention or adult jail for behaviors ranging from disorderly 
conduct to violating the dress code.   
 Moreover, black students are more likely to be arrested.  In October, 2012, the U.S. 
Justice Department filed a suit against the City of Meridian, Lauderdale County, and the 
Mississippi Division of Youth Services alleging that armed guards at their schools routinely 
violated the due process rights of children, particularly of black and disabled students.  Armed 
officers are accused of handcuffing, detaining, arresting and incarcerating students without 
informing of their rights, without timely probable cause hearings, and without legal 
representation, for minor offenses such as school disciplinary infractions (Department of Justice, 
2012).  
 President Obama has called for $155 million for mental health services and to develop 
police/school partnerships, $150 million for school districts to train teachers and staff, to hire 
“school resource officers,” psychologists, counselors, and social workers, and to upgrade 
security equipment and emergency plans, $50 million for staff and teacher training, and $30 
million in one-time grants to assist school districts in developing and implementing emergency 
plans (Gray, 2013).  Although $385 million sounds like a lot of money, it is just a drop in the 
bucket.   
A hypothetical state with only 1 high school in each of its 140 districts would spend 
about $555,000 per school, or a total of $77.7 million on enhanced security systems with 
cameras, access-control systems, duress alarm systems, safety film, and on one security officer 
per school per year (Lohman & Shepard, 2006; Gray, 2013).  The $385 million, then, would not 
go very far, covering only about 5 states (given the above scenario).  Although helpful, these 
funds would have to be supplemented by significant local, state, or private funding (e.g., the 
NRA).  
Preventing school violence does not have to be expensive.  All it takes is preventing the 
development of young men and women into perpetrators of school violence, and putting armed 
guards at fortified schools will not do this.  It requires the development of early recognition 
programs run by individuals trained to spot warning signs and situations that are correlated with 
violence.  It requires the development of intervention programs staffed by professionals trained 
in defusing potentially violent situations and addressing those correlates, whether they are mental 
health problems, family issues, bully issues, relationship issues, conflict resolution issues, or 
self-esteem issues.  In other words, it just requires someone to pay attention, to listen, and to 
care, which really cost nothing.        
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Table 1 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Trained, Armed Security Guards & Community Volunteers 
Table 1 
  
Advantages Disadvantages 
 
Decreased public fear  
 
Increased potential for accidents 
 
Increased public perceptions of safety 
 
False sense of security 
 
Quicker response time to incidents 
 
Increased potential for civil and/or criminal liability 
 
Potential to intervene and prevent or reduce harm 
 
Increased availability of weapons 
 
May dissuade less motivated potential offenders 
 
Providing more people greater access to children 
 
Increased profits for security industry 
 
Increased cost to school districts 
  
Increased referrals to juvenile justice system 
  
Decreased graduation rates/Increased dropouts 
  
Increased fear and resentment among children 
  
Potential negative impact on school climate 
  
Potential diversion of law enforcement resources 
  
Insurance and Worker's Compensation issues 
  
Potential union conflicts 
  
Officer cooperation & morale 
Table 2 
Liability Issues Related to Armed Guards in Schools 
 
                     Potential Liability     Who is Potentially Held Liable? 
Type of Officers 
     On-duty, off-duty, retired public police officers 
     Current or former military/National Guard 
     Private security 
     Parents/Community Volunteers      
School Boards 
Recruitment of Officers 
     Misrepresentation of duties 
Police Departments, School Boards, Private 
Security Agencies, Consulting Firms 
Selection of Officers 
     Criminal history checks 
     Drug testing 
     Psychological evaluations 
     Physical qualifications 
Police Departments, School Boards, Private 
Security Agencies, Consulting Firms 
Training of Officers 
     Firearms training 
     Criminal procedure dealing with juveniles 
          Interviewing & interrogating juveniles 
          Search & seizure with juveniles 
          Detention/arrest of juveniles 
     Investigations in a school environment 
     Psychology of juveniles 
     Dealing with parents 
     Transporting/transferring juveniles 
     Juvenile petitions 
     Testifying in detention hearings 
Police Departments, Local or State Training 
Academies, Private Security Agencies, Private 
Consultants 
Supervision of Officers 
     Oversight of daily operations 
     Reporting of problems with officers 
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies, 
School Boards, Principals 
Duty or Failure to Act 
     Protect others or fail to protect others 
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies, 
School Boards, Principals, Teachers, Individuals 
Departmental Policies, Rules & Regulations      Police Departments, Private Security Agencies 
Zero Tolerance versus Selective Enforcement 
     Potential for bias & discrimination 
     Treatment of minor or school infractions 
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies, 
School Boards, Principals, Individuals 
Access to Facilities 
     Rooms, equipment, records 
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies, 
School Boards, Principals, Individuals 
Access to Children 
     Power & authority 
     Abuse of trust 
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies, 
School Boards, Principals, Individuals 
Personal Relationships with Children 
     Potential for bias (positive or negative) 
Police Departments, Private Security Agencies, 
School Boards, Principals, Individuals 
Student Rights to Privacy Police Departments, Private Security Agencies, 
School Boards, Principals, Teachers, Individuals 
Table 2 
